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STRIVING FOR CONSISTENCY: THE 
BATTLE OF JURISDICTION IN ENFORCING 
ARBITRATION AWARDS 
Abstract: On January 20, 2017, in Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Securities of Puerto 
Rico, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expanded the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Vaden v. Discovery Bank and held that the “look through” ap-
proach to determine federal jurisdiction applied to petitions to enforce, modify, 
and vacate arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. The First Circuit 
relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Vaden to support its conclu-
sion that applying the “look through” test created a single and consistent jurisdic-
tional approach. This Comment argues that the First Circuit was correct in its ap-
plication of the “look through” approach because it avoided the “curious practical 
consequences” that troubled the Vaden court. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and individual state statutes regulate 
arbitration, which is a form of dispute resolution in the United States.1 The 
FAA provides courts with mechanisms to stay litigation pending arbitration, 
compel arbitration, and confirm, modify, or vacate arbitration awards.2 The 
FAA is unique because it does not on its own provide a basis for jurisdiction in 
federal court.3 There must be an independent jurisdictional basis before a party 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); see Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration 
Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 NEV. L.J. 
427, 430 (2007) (noting that arbitration law in the United States is governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) and state statutes). Most state statutes governing arbitration are based on of the Uniform 
Arbitration Act (“UAA”). See id.; see also The RUAA Moves Toward National Passage, DISP. 57 
RESOL. J. 5, 5 (May–July 2002) (explaining that forty-nine states have adopted the UAA of 1956 and 
nineteen states are considering enacting the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act). 
 2 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4, 9–11. Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA grant courts the power to enforce 
post-arbitration awards by confirming, modifying, or vacating an arbitration award. See id. §§ 9–11. 
When a judge modifies, confirms, or vacates an arbitration award, the standard of review of the arbi-
trator’s decisions is especially deferential. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(finding that when enforcing arbitration agreements there is a vast deferential standard towards the 
arbitrator’s decision); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 431 (describing how the FAA gives the judicial 
branch the power to confirm, stay, modify, or vacate both arbitration decisions and awards). The rea-
son that courts are required to give a highly deferential standard to an arbitrator’s award is because 
one of Congress’s goals in enacting the FAA was to encourage courts easily affirm arbitration agree-
ments. See Dluhos, 321 F.3d at 370 (explaining that the deferential standard that courts give arbitra-
tion agreements aligns with the purpose of the FAA). 
 3 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2008) (noting that the FAA does not provide 
federal jurisdiction but instead provides access to a federal forum if there is an independent jurisdic-
tional basis); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581–82 (2007) (finding the FAA to be 
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can access a federal forum.4 In 2009, in Vaden v. Discovery Bank, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that in determining whether a federal court had jurisdiction 
over a FAA § 4 petition to compel arbitration, the court is permitted to “look 
through” the arbitration agreement to the underlying controversy to establish if 
it is grounded under federal law.5 The Vaden opinion reconciled a split among 
circuits regarding the application of the “look through” approach to § 4 peti-
tions, but it created another split among the circuits as to whether the “look 
through” approach applies to the entire FAA or exclusively to § 4.6 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits held 
that the “look through” approach applies exclusively to § 4 petitions, while the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the “look 
through” approach extended at least to petitions to vacate arbitration awards 
under § 10 of the FAA.7 More recently, in 2017, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit in Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico 
went beyond the Second Circuit’s decision in holding that the “look through” 
approach applied to petitions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards 
                                                                                                                           
an “anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction” because it grants no federal jurisdiction); Moses 
H. Cone Memorial. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (explaining that federal 
jurisdiction over the FAA runs concurrent with state jurisdiction). 
 4 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59 (finding that the FAA does not provide subject matter jurisdiction but 
rather a federal forum if there is another independent jurisdiction basis); Hall, 552 U.S. at 581–82 
(citing Moses H. Cone Memorial. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 (explaining that the FAA is unique in the 
sense that it doesn’t confer federal jurisdiction on its own); Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration 
Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007) (explaining 
that in order for a party to have a federal court enforce the FAA, there must be an independent subject 
matter basis that provides a federal court with jurisdiction). 
 5 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (holding that in order to have federal jurisdiction over an arbitration 
agreement to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA, the court should “look through” the § 4 peti-
tion to the underlying substantive controversy to determine whether the underlying substantive con-
troversy would provide jurisdiction to the court); see also Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. of P.R., 852 
F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2017) (referencing Vaden’s holding that the correct inquiry into a petition to 
compel arbitration under the FAA is whether there would be federal jurisdiction over the parties “save 
for [the arbitration] agreement”). A § 4 petition is a petition made to a court to compel arbitration 
pursuant to an arbitration agreement made between the parties. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
 6 See, e.g., Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 44 (describing a circuit split and holding that the “look 
through” approach applied to §§ 9–11 as well as § 4 of the FAA); Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 
834 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the “look through” approach did not apply to the provi-
sions outside of § 4). 
 7 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 44–45 (agreeing with the Second Circuit that the “look 
through” approach extends beyond petitions to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA). Compare 
Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (holding that the “look through” approach applied to § 4 in Vaden did not 
extend to § 10 motions to vacate arbitration awards), and Magruder v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., 818 F.3d 
285, 288 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that the “look through” approach used in Vaden did not extend to § 9 
and § 10 of the FAA), with Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 389 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(holding the “look through” approach extended to § 10 petitions to vacate). 
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under §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA.8 The First Circuit relied heavily on the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Vaden that the FAA should be construed in a man-
ner that avoids a “curious practical consequences.”9 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-Espinosa 
to apply the “look through” approach to provisions outside of § 4 is a practical 
and necessary extension of the Vaden decision.10 Part I of this Comment dis-
cusses the policies behind the FAA and the jurisdictional split among Federal 
Circuit Courts over arbitration agreements as well as the procedural back-
ground of Ortiz-Espinosa.11 Part II explains how the current split among cir-
cuits in interpreting the statutory language of the FAA effects federal jurisdic-
tion determinations.12 Part III of this Comment argues that the First Circuit 
correctly followed Supreme Court precedent in holding that the “look through” 
approach is applicable to multiple sections of the FAA because it creates con-
sistency in enforcing the FAA.13 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION  
OVER ARBITRATION 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to combat judicial hostility toward ar-
bitration and to encourage the enforcement of arbitration awards by placing 
them on the same ground as other contracts.14 The FAA and similar state stat-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 47 (finding the “look through” approach is appropriate to de-
termine if there is federal jurisdiction to vacate, modify, or confirm an arbitration award); Doscher, 
832 F.3d at 389 (holding the “look through” approach applies to § 10 of the FAA). 
 9 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 46–47 (citing Vaden and finding that it would result in “curious 
practical consequences” to allow a federal court to compel arbitration and forbid a federal court from 
confirming, vacating, or modifying the same arbitration award); see also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65 (find-
ing that it would result in “curious practical consequences” to allow a petitioner to litigate a federal 
question claim arising out of an arbitration agreement in federal court but not allow a federal court to 
compel arbitration on the same federal question issue). The First Circuit in Ortiz-Espinosa further 
found that these “curious practical consequences” would lead to inconsistencies in decisions because 
federal courts would have jurisdiction to compel the arbitration but state courts would be the ones 
deciding to confirm, modify, or vacate the award because state law could be different from federal 
law. See id. at 47. The court in Vaden held that the “look through” approach was proper for § 4 peti-
tions to compel arbitration. See 556 U.S. at 65 (explaining that the “look through” approach allowed 
the court to determine if it had jurisdiction over the matter without requiring the parties to first litigate 
the issue). It based its conclusion on of the textual language in § 4 and the practical consequences that 
failing to apply the “look through” approach would create. See id. at 62, 65 (finding that the textual 
provisions in the statute, along with the “curious practical consequences” that would result if the “look 
through” approach was not applied, was critical to the Court’s holding). 
 10 See infra notes 91–107 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–55 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 56–90 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 91–107 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (finding that the FAA put 
agreements to arbitrate “on equal footing with all other contracts”); see also Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 
v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2007) (noting that Congress enacted the FAA to remedy judicial hostili-
502 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
utes created a judicial framework to ensure that arbitration agreements were 
upheld pursuant to contract.15 Prior to 1984, federal courts were divided on the 
question of whether the FAA’s substantive law applied in state courts as well as 
federal courts, because the FAA does not contain an explicit preemptive provi-
sion and Congress’s purpose was not to displace all state arbitration law.16 In 
Southland Corp. v Keating, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this divide 
and held that the substantive law created by the FAA is applicable in both state 
and federal courts.17 
                                                                                                                           
ty towards arbitration and to put arbitration on the same grounds as other contracts); Jodi Wilson, How 
the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
91, 92–93 (2012) (noting that, per the House and Senate Reports, the goal of the FAA was to defeat 
judicial hostility towards arbitration by positioning arbitration agreements on the “same footing as 
other contracts”). Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, there was a significant amount of judi-
cial hostility towards arbitration agreements. See Hall, 552 U.S. at 581 (explaining that Congress 
enacted the FAA to overcome judicial hostility towards arbitration). Despite parties having an arbitra-
tion agreement, courts would allow the party that no longer wished to arbitrate to revoke the arbitra-
tion agreement. See Wilson, supra, at 98. Courts justified this refusal to compel arbitration on the idea 
that parties could not decide to expel jurisdiction themselves and on the idea of fairness. See id. at 99 
(explaining that some courts refused to compel arbitration agreements because they could not promise 
justice in arbitration proceedings). 
 15 See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 431 (commenting that one aspect of the judicial framework 
to enforce arbitration agreements was through speedy interlocutory review of decisions made by 
courts to compel or stay arbitration agreements according to the contract language). In enacting the 
FAA, Congress felt that courts had placed arbitration agreements on less equal footing than any other 
contract. See Hall, 552 U.S. at 581 (explaining that Congress enacted the FAA to overcome judicial 
hostility towards arbitration and put arbitration contracts on the same footing as other contracts); see 
also Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443 (noting that the FAA was enacted to thwart judicial resistance towards 
arbitration). Therefore, one of the goals of the FAA was to ensure that judicial hostility towards arbi-
tration agreements would dissipate by forcing the courts to treat arbitration agreements like all other 
contracts. See Hall, 552 U.S. at 581; Wilson, supra note 14, at 100 (explaining that § 2 of the FAA 
was enacted to put arbitration agreements on “the same footing as other contracts”). 
 16 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956) (holding that where 
the FAA does not cover a contract, state arbitration law prevails). But see, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., v. Bd. 
of Trustees of LeLand Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (explaining that even where 
Congress has not explicitly displaced state law, if state law stands in the way of the objectives of Con-
gress, it will be preempted); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (finding that federal law 
preempts state law when the state law interferes with the objectives and purposes of Congress); Sak-
kab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., 803 F.3d 425, 431–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding a state law is preempt-
ed if it contradicts the objectives of the FAA). The FAA does not contain a clear preemption provision 
and Congress never intended to have all arbitration governed exclusively by the federal government. 
See Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (finding that the FAA does not embody a congressional intent to govern all 
arbitration). 
 17 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (finding that Congress intended the 
substantive law of the FAA to be applicable to both state and federal courts so that no state could 
undermine its goal of putting arbitration agreements on the same level as all other contracts). It would 
not have made sense for Congress to limit the FAA to only federal courts because in doing so, a state 
that disagreed with placing arbitration on equal footing as contracts could undermine the entire goal of 
the FAA. See id. (noting that the FAA is a substantive body of law that applies in both state and feder-
al courts in order to prevent states from undermining the purpose of the FAA). 
2018] Determining Jurisdiction Under the Federal Arbitration Act 503 
Federal courts often disagree over whether to apply the “look through” 
approach to the FAA.18 Section A of this Part provides an overview of the FAA 
and its policies.19 Section B describes the Vaden decision, applying the “look 
through” approach to the FAA.20 Section C details the factual background, 
procedural history, and holding of Ortiz-Espinosa.21 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act, Its Policies, and Its Confusion 
In the early to mid 1900s, arbitration agreements became increasingly 
prominent in business contracts and transactions; yet, courts often refused to 
compel these arbitration agreements.22 Businesses became wary of the courts’ 
hostility towards arbitration agreements and lobbied Congress for a change.23 
Congress responded by enacting the FAA with the intent to make arbitration 
agreements equal to all other contracts, and to extricate the judicial hostility 
towards arbitration.24 The FAA has since morphed into a national policy favor-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 63–90 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 42–55 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Wilson, supra note 14, at 98–99 (describing that despite arbitration agreements becoming 
more popular, courts would not always enforce the arbitration agreements). Courts resisted compelling 
arbitration on the basis that parties cannot force jurisdiction out of the courts and based on the idea of 
fairness. See id. at 99 (explaining that courts were defiant in compelling arbitration agreements be-
cause jurisdiction could not be “oust[ed]” and there was no certainty that the individuals involved 
would be treated fairly in arbitration proceedings). Fairness was a premise for refusing to compel 
arbitration agreement because the court could not guaranty that rights would be protected in arbitra-
tion. See id. 
 23 See id. at 102 (noting that although the FAA was intended to put arbitration agreements on 
equal ground as other contracts, the Supreme Court began favoring them over other contractual 
agreements). Businesses became incredibly reliant on arbitration agreements and were displeased with 
the judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements, so they lobbied Congress. See id. (explaining that 
businesses lobbied Congress to create legislation that would force the courts to enforce arbitration 
agreements). In response, Congress adopted the FAA and created a national policy that favored arbi-
tration agreements. See id. at 99 (commenting that in response to the business community’s lobbying 
efforts, Congress enacted the FAA). Courts then heavily relied on the FAA, which created a policy of 
pro-arbitration decisions. See id. at 102 (noting that the court’s heavy reliance on the FAA created a 
policy that favored arbitration agreements); see, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 58 (2008) 
(finding that in enacting the FAA, Congress created a policy that favored arbitration); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 421 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (commenting 
that the majority was generous in enforcing arbitration agreements because it furthers the liberal poli-
cy that Congress created favoring arbitration). 
 24 See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 302 (2015) (noting that the 
policy of the FAA was to overcome judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements and put them on 
the same ground as other contracts); Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 434 (holding that the goal of the FAA was to 
defeat judicial decisions that refused to enforce arbitration agreements); Rachel Arnow-Richman, 
Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 427, 448 (2016) (explaining that the FAA 
restricts the grounds on which a court can void an arbitration agreement);Wilson, supra note 14, at 98, 
100 (finding that the FAA was enacted to put arbitration agreements on equal footing as other con-
tracts). 
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ing arbitration when the parties have contracted to resolve disputes in this 
manner, even if a state law does not favor arbitration.25 
The FAA is applicable to agreements to arbitrate in any transaction in-
volving commerce or in any maritime transaction.26 Whether this provision, 
§ 2 of the FAA, created a substantive or procedural body of law was unclear 
until the Supreme Court’s decision in Southland.27 In Southland, the Court 
held that the FAA is a substantive body of law that is binding on both federal 
and state courts.28 The Court reaffirmed its position that the FAA does not on 
its own confer federal jurisdiction.29 Therefore, federal jurisdiction over con-
troversies involving arbitration cannot be based on the FAA’s relevant substan-
tive law; there must be an independent jurisdictional basis to access a federal 
forum.30 
In the Supreme Court’s decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of LeLand Stanford Junior University, the Court recognized 
that although the FAA applies to both state and federal courts, parties can agree 
to arbitrate under state law as long as the state law does not conflict with the 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 US 333, 345–46 (2016) (holding that the FAA created 
a national policy that favored arbitration despite contradicting state law); Vaden, 556 U.S. at 58 (find-
ing the FAA created a national policy that favored arbitration when parties agreed to resolve disputes 
in that manner); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(finding that as a matter of law, the FAA dictates that doubts regarding the scope of arbitration agree-
ments should be decided in favor of arbitration). 
 26 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 27 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 12, 14 (noting that the legislative history behind the FAA had ambi-
guities regarding whether the FAA applied to state courts or purely federal forums or whether it was a 
procedural law or substantive law). In Southland, the Supreme Court held the FAA created a substan-
tive body of law that was equally applicable in state and federal court. See id. at 16. 
 28 See id. at 16 (holding that Congress intended the FAA to be a body of substantive federal law 
that mandates that parties arbitrate when they contracted to do so and is applicable to both federal and 
state courts). Despite the ambiguities in the legislative intent of the FAA, the Court in Southland held 
that the FAA preempted state law and reaffirmed that the FAA created a body of substantive law. See 
id. at 15–16. The Court in Southland reasoned that because it was Congress’s intent to place arbitra-
tion agreements on the same footing as contracts, Congress could not have intended to limit arbitra-
tion disputes solely to federal jurisdiction because doing so would have placed contracts and arbitra-
tion agreements on unequal footing. See id.; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (finding 
that the FAA is a body of substantive federal law). 
 29 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59 (holding that although the FAA is a body of substantive law it does 
not convey federal jurisdiction in itself); Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 382 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that the FAA provides no federal jurisdiction on its own and there must be an 
independent jurisdictional basis over the dispute). The result of the FAA creating a body of substan-
tive federal law applicable in state courts is that in order for there to be federal jurisdiction over a case, 
there has to be an independent jurisdictional basis other than the FAA. See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382 
(commenting that because the FAA did not provide federal question jurisdiction over a case, there had 
to be an independent jurisdictional basis over the issue in order to obtain access to a federal forum). 
 30 See Hall, 552 U.S. at 581–82 (holding that because the FAA is somewhat odd and does not 
confer jurisdiction itself, there must be an independent basis to exercise federal jurisdiction); Vaden, 
556 U.S. at 59 (reaffirming the holding in Hall that because the FAA does bestow subject matter ju-
risdiction, there must be an independent basis over the dispute in order to access a federal forum). 
2018] Determining Jurisdiction Under the Federal Arbitration Act 505 
objectives of the FAA.31 In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel Inc., the Court pro-
vided additional guidance on when state law could displace the FAA.32 State 
law could displace the FAA if it was explicitly written into the arbitration 
agreement that state law would govern the arbitration agreement.33 Although 
Volt and Hall both recognized that state law could displace the FAA in certain 
instances, the decision created uncertainty in determining if federal or state 
courts had jurisdiction over staying litigation, compelling arbitration, and con-
firming, modifying, or vacating post–arbitration awards, when the original ar-
bitration agreement had no explicit jurisdictional clauses.34 
B. The Court in Vaden Addresses Jurisdiction Over Arbitration Agreements 
In 2009, the Supreme Court in Vaden sought to resolve the split among 
Federal Circuit Courts over whether jurisdiction to compel arbitration was 
based on the arbitration agreement itself or on the underlying controversies to 
which the arbitration agreement related.35 The Court held the latter and found 
it appropriate to “look through” to the underlying controversy to determine 
whether there was federal or state jurisdiction over § 4 petitions to compel ar-
bitration.36 In its decision, the Court examined the language of § 4 and found 
that the text indicated that a federal court should determine its jurisdiction by 
looking through a § 4 petition to the underlying dispute.37 The phrase in § 4, 
“save for [the arbitration] agreement” guided the court to its holding that a dis-
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (finding where the parties agreed to arbitrate under state law, enforc-
ing the state law according to the agreement does not conflict with the objectives of the FAA). 
 32 See Hall, 552 U.S. at 590 (explaining the FAA isn’t the only way into court and parties can 
agree to enforcement under state law). 
 33 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 42 (reading Hall to hold that the FAA can only be displaced by 
state law if the parties explicitly agree to do so). If there are no explicit provisions in the arbitration 
agreement, the FAA will apply. See id. 
 34 See id. (finding that under Hall, where the FAA applies, it may only be displaced by state law 
if the parties agree to do so explicitly). What wasn’t answered in Hall was whether a court should look 
at the arbitration agreement itself or the underlying issue that the controversy is based upon to deter-
mine if federal or state law should apply. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 63 (noting the majority of Court of 
Appeals believed that to determine jurisdiction over arbitration agreements, a court should not “look 
through” the arbitration agreement to the underlying controversy). 
 35 Compare Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the 
court may “look through” a § 4 petition to see if it has jurisdiction on an independent basis from the 
FAA), with Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 463 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to apply the 
“look through” approach to determine jurisdiction for a § 4 petition to compel arbitration and instead 
basing jurisdiction on the arbitration agreement). 
 36 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 (2008) (holding that the court may “look 
through” a § 4 motion to compel arbitration to the underlying controversy to see if it would have ju-
risdiction). A § 4 petition allows an aggrieved party to petition the court to compel arbitration when 
the opposing party refuses, fails, or neglects to arbitrate as provided for in an arbitration agreement. 
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); Vaden, 556 U.S. at 75. 
 37 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (explaining that the text “save for [the arbitration] agreement” in § 4 
was crucial to its holding). 
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trict court should determine whether it had jurisdiction if, absent the arbitration 
agreement, it would have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.38 
The Vaden decision to apply the “look through” approach to § 4 petitions 
avoided the “curious practical consequences” of a situation where a federal 
court could only entertain a § 4 petition if there was already a separate federal 
issue before the court.39 Instead, by “looking through” to the parties’ underly-
ing dispute, a federal court could compel arbitration without first requiring the 
petitioner to formally file or remove the federal issue the party sought to arbi-
trate in the first place.40 Although the decision in Vaden provided guidance in 
applying the “look through” approach to § 4 petitions of the FAA, it left unan-
swered the question of whether the look through approach should be applied to 
other provisions within the FAA that omitted the same language as § 4.41 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See id. (instructing a court to decide if it would have subject matter jurisdiction over the con-
troversy between the parties in the absence of the arbitration agreement). 
 39 See id. at 65 (holding that it would be a questionable result for a federal court to only have 
jurisdiction over a § 4 petition if it had a federal-question suit already before the court, it was a diver-
sity case, or if it involved a maritime contract). If the “look through” test was not applied to a § 4 
petition to compel arbitration, it would have created “curious practical consequences” since it would 
result in a federal court only being allowed to hear federal question cases if it involved a maritime 
contract or if the suit arose under diversity of citizenship. See id. (explaining the “curious practical 
consequences” that would result if the “look through” approach was not applied). The decision in 
Vaden allowed federal courts jurisdiction over arbitration agreements that arose out of a purely federal 
question issue. See id. (explaining that federal courts could “look through” a § 4 petition to determine 
if it had jurisdiction over the underlying issue). 
 40 See id. (explaining how the “look through” approach allows a federal court to determine if they 
have subject matter jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement without requiring the parties’ to file a 
separate suit in federal court). The Vaden decision aligns with the goals of Congress in creating the 
FAA because rather than making a party litigate the issue it wished to arbitrate first, it allows the 
judge to compel arbitration first. See id. (finding that allowing a court to “look through” a § 4 petition 
to determine if it had jurisdiction over the matter saved the parties from having to first litigate the 
same issue it contracted to arbitrate in the first place); Moses H. Cone Memorial. Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting that the FAA reflects a liberal policy favoring arbitra-
tion). There are “curious practical consequences” when a party would be able to file a suit in federal 
court arising out of an issue that the parties agreed to arbitrate but would not be able to file a petition 
to compel arbitration over the same issue in federal court. See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65. 
 41 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (holding that the “look through” was appropriate for a § 4 petition to 
establish whether the action was governed by federal law). The key language in § 4 of the FAA that 
Vaden relied on was “save for [the arbitration] agreement” and “would have jurisdiction under title 
28.” See id. (finding the “save for [the arbitration] agreement” and “would have jurisdiction under title 
28” critical to the Court’s holding that a federal court should “look through” a § 4 petition to deter-
mine jurisdiction). Following Vaden, the circuits split as to whether the “look through” approach was 
applicable to just § 4 petitions to compel arbitration or if it applied to the entire FAA. See Goldman v. 
Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 834 F.3d 242, 254 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the “look through” approach 
from Vaden did not extend to § 10 of the FAA); Magruder v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., 818 F.3d 285, 
288 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding the “look through” basis was not appropriate for § 9 and/or § 10 peti-
tions). But see Doscher, 832 F.3d at 389 (concluding that federal courts were permitted to apply the 
“look through” approach to § 10 petitions). The court in Goldman found that the “look through” ap-
proach should not apply to § 10 of the FAA since it does not contain the same key language as § 4 and 
Congress’s intention in passing the FAA was based on enforcement of arbitration agreements. See 834 
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C. First Circuit Strives for Consistency and Applies the “Look Through” 
Approach to Other Provisions of the FAA in Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA 
Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc. 
In 2006, Dr. Luis Ortiz-Espinosa and his wife (“Investors”) opened two 
sets of brokerage investment accounts with BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico, 
Inc. (“BBVA”).42 By 2009, the Investors had suffered significant losses related 
to their investment accounts and sought relief against BBVA.43 Pursuant to the 
brokerage agreement, which required the parties to resolve disputes through 
arbitration, the Investors filed a claim before the Federal Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) against both BBVA and the broker managing the two 
accounts.44 In their claim, the Investors asserted that BBVA and the broker 
managing their accounts engaged in a pattern of unsuitable investments in high 
risk securities with the sole intent of maximizing commissions for themselves, 
violating both federal and Puerto Rican securities law.45 In 2012, after seven-
teen hearing sessions in Puerto Rico, the three–member arbitration panel is-
sued an award in favor of BBVA and the broker.46 
The Investors then filed a petition to vacate or modify the arbitration 
award under the Puerto Rico Arbitration Act (“PRAA”) in the Puerto Rico 
Court of First Instance.47 BBVA removed the case to the federal court in Puerto 
Rico, asserting that federal question jurisdiction existed because the underlying 
claims were based on federal securities law.48 The Investors moved to remand 
                                                                                                                           
F.3d at 254. In contrast, in Doscher, the court found the “look through” approach was applicable to 
§ 10 of the FAA. See 832 F.3d at 389. The court in Doscher reasoned that failing to apply the “look 
through” approach would create the same “curious practical consequences” that Vaden avoided. See 
id. 
 42 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 40 (explaining Dr. Luis Ortiz-Espinosa and his wife opened 
two accounts with BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc. (“BBVA”)). The claimants deposited a com-
bined $2,604,208 with BBVA. See id. (noting that of the money deposited with BBVA, $2,113,154 
was deposited into personal accounts and $491,054 was deposited into retirement accounts). 
 43 See id. (noting that the couple had lost a significant amount of money related to their two 
BBVA accounts). The claimants lost $2,049,240 in total. Id. 
 44 See id. (finding the brokerage agreement stipulated for the arbitration of disputes before the 
Federal Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)). 
 45 See id. (remarking that the Investors claimed that BBVA and the broker deceived them by 
partaking in a series of high risk securities investments with the sole intent of maximizing trading 
profits and commissions in violation of federal and Puerto Rico law). Specifically, claimants alleged 
violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, and state and contract claims. Id. 
 46 See id. at 41 (explaining that the arbitration panel ruled in favor of BBVA and the broker). 
 47 See id. (noting the petitioners did not invoke the FAA but instead sought relief under PRAA). 
The claimants’ motion to vacate or modify the arbitration award relied on various mistakes made by 
the arbitrators including a bias against the claimants and a refusal to hear additional evidence. See id. 
 48 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 41 (explaining that BBVA argued that the federal district court 
had jurisdiction over the petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award because the underlying 
issues were based on federal law). BBVA asserted that the court should “look through” the petition to 
modify and vacate the arbitration to see what the underlying issue was based on and because it was 
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the claim to state court arguing that their complaint did not invoke the FAA, 
but rather only asserted a claim under the PRAA and therefore raised no feder-
al question.49 
In applying the “look through” approach, the United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico denied the motion to remand and found that be-
cause the underlying controversy asserted federal claims, the district court had 
federal question jurisdiction.50 The district court subsequently denied the In-
vestors’ petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award and entered a judg-
ment confirming the award.51 In response, the Investors appealed both the dis-
trict court’s denial of their motion to remand their case back to Puerto Rican 
state court and the district court’s judgment confirming the arbitration award.52 
On appeal to the First Circuit, the Investors argued that because they 
brought suit under PRAA and only asserted state law causes of action, it was 
not proper for the district court to apply the “look through” approach to obtain 
subject matter jurisdiction.53 The First Circuit rejected this argument and held 
that notwithstanding the Investors bringing their petition to modify or vacate 
under the PRAA, the FAA preempts the PRAA because it applies to arbitration 
agreements “in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce.”54 In addition, the First Circuit held that the district court 
                                                                                                                           
based on federal law, the district court had jurisdiction. Id. Defendants additionally argued that the 
court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id. Federal question jurisdiction pro-
vides federal courts the authority to hear matters that arise from the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (explaining that in order to 
have federal question jurisdiction over a matter, a plaintiff must plead a cause of action that is derived 
from the Constitution or laws of the United States). 
 49 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 42. The Investors argued that they brought a claim to vacate 
the arbitration award under Puerto Rican arbitration law not federal arbitration law. See id. 
 50 Id. (explaining the Investors filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order denying 
their motion to remand; however the district court dismissed the appeal since the order was not a final 
decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291). 
 51 See id. (noting the district court denied the Investors’ petition to modify or vacate the arbitra-
tion award). The court denied the Investors’ petition to vacate or modify the arbitration award on 
grounds that they did not demonstrate any plausible ground for vacating or modifying the arbitration 
award. Id. The district court did not decide whether the FAA or PRAA standards for vacating or modi-
fying the arbitration award applied, finding that because of the similarities between the FAA and 
PRAA regarding vacating or modifying an arbitration award, neither one warranted a change in the 
arbitration award. Id. 
 52 Id. at 41–42 
 53 Id. at 42. The claimants further argued that the text of the FAA only permits the application of 
the “look through” approach to § 4 petitions to compel arbitration and their petition was to modify or 
vacate the arbitration award. Id. 
 54 Id. at 42 (holding Hall to read that where the FAA applies, it may only be displaced by state 
law if the parties agree to it explicitly). Here, the court found there was no language showing the par-
ties contemplated enforcement under the PRAA and no language indicating the parties intended that 
state law would govern vacating or modifying the arbitration award, therefore the FAA is the applica-
ble law. Id. 
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properly applied the “look through” approach to §§ 9–11 of the Investors’ peti-
tion.55 
II. CIRCUITS CONFLICT AGAIN IN APPLYING THE “LOOK THROUGH” 
APPROACH TO THE FAA 
Although the Vaden v. Discovery Bank decision resolved the split among 
Federal Circuit Courts as to whether it was appropriate to apply the “look 
through” approach to § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), it provided 
little guidance regarding the rest of the FAA.56 This ambiguity regarding where 
the “look through” approach should be applied, occurred in part, because of 
the dual reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court used to reach its conclusion.57 The 
Court in Vaden relied heavily on both the text of § 4 and on the real-world con-
sequences that would result if the “look through” approach was set aside.58 The 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 47. 
 56 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2008) (finding it is appropriate for a federal 
court to “look through” a § 4 petition to compel arbitration to the parties’ underlying substantive con-
troversy to see if there is subject matter jurisdiction). Prior to the Vaden decision, the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits held that it was not proper to “look through” a § 4 
petition to determine jurisdiction while in contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and 
Eleventh Circuits held that a court could “look through” a § 4 petition to compel arbitration to deter-
mine if there was federal subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 57 (finding that the lower courts were 
in conflict regarding whether a federal court could “look through” a § 4 petition to compel arbitration 
to determine if the court had jurisdiction); Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597, 606 (11th Cir. 
2007) (holding that the district court was correct in “look[ing] through” the underlying dispute to 
determine if it had jurisdiction over a § 4 petition); Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 367 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that to compel arbitration a court should determine if it has federal question juris-
diction over the underlying issue). But see Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that the FAA and the underlying claims of the arbitration agreement did not provide 
an independent basis for federal question jurisdiction); Westmoreland Capital Corp. v. Findlay, 100 
F.3d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that it was proper for the lower court to dismiss a petition to 
compel arbitration because it lacked jurisdiction even though the underlying claim was based on fed-
eral law); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Fitch, 966 F.2d 981, 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that 
jurisdiction over a § 4 petition must be determined based on the face of the petition). After the Vaden 
decision, circuits continued to split as to whether Vaden applied to the entire FAA or exclusively to 
§ 4. Compare Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. of P.R., 852 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding the “look 
through” approach to be appropriate to determine federal jurisdiction), and Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. 
Sec., 832 F.3d 372, 389 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that federal courts may “look through” § 10 petitions 
to determine if the court had federal question jurisdiction over the underlying issue), with Goldman v. 
Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 834 F.3d 242, 254 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that the “look through” approach 
did not apply to § 10 petitions), and Magruder v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., 818 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 
2016) (holding that the “look through” approach did not apply to § 9 or § 10 petitions). 
 57 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62, 65 (explaining that its decision was driven by the text of § 4 and 
avoided “curious practical consequences”). 
 58 See id. at 62 (holding that the “save for [the arbitration] language” in § 4 of the FAA implies 
that courts should exercise their jurisdiction over a controversy by determining if absent the arbitration 
agreement it would have jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties under Title 28). Yet, in 
the same section of the Court’s opinion, the Court concludes that in addition to the textual reasons for 
holding that the “look through” approach applies to § 4 petitions, there are also practical reasons for 
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Court’s silence regarding the rest of the FAA left Federal Circuit Courts once 
again split when it came to applying the “look through” approach to sections 
outside of § 4 petitions of the FAA.59 
Federal Circuit Courts have not been consistent in their application of the 
“look through” approach to provisions outside of § 4 of the FAA.60 Section A 
of this Part details how the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and 
Seventh Circuits have applied the “look through” approach to the FAA.61 Sec-
tion B of this part examines the First Circuit’s decision in Ortiz-Espinosa v. 
BBVA Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc. to apply the “look through” approach § 9, 
§ 10, and § 11 of the FAA.62 
A. The Third and Seventh Circuits Stuck on the Statutory  
Language of the FAA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Magruder v. Fidelity 
Brokerage Services, in 2016, relied almost exclusively on the statutory lan-
guage differences within the different sections of the FAA to hold that the 
“look through” approach only applied to § 4 petitions to compel arbitration.63 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed suit in Goldman v. 
Citigroup Global Markets in 2016, finding that the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania properly granted a Rule 12(b)(1) mo-
tion to dismiss a § 10 petition to vacate an arbitration award because it could 
not “look through” the petition to establish jurisdiction.64 
                                                                                                                           
its application. See id. at 65 (finding that failing to apply the “look through” approach to § 4 petitions 
would have “curious practical consequences” because it would allow a federal court to entertain a § 4 
petition only when there was a federal question already before the court). Applying the “look through” 
approach allows a § 4 petitioner to ask a federal court to compel arbitration without having to litigate 
the matter first, which was an essential goal of the FAA. See id.; see also AT&T Mobility v. Concep-
cion, 563 US 333, 345–46 (2016) (explaining that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration when 
the parties contracted to arbitrate disputes). 
 59 Compare Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254–55 (concluding that Vaden’s “look through” approach for 
jurisdiction does not extend beyond § 4 of the FAA), with Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 44 (agreeing 
with the Second Circuit that the “look through” approach was not limited to § 4 petitions of the FAA). 
The rest of the FAA includes petitions to confirm, modify, and vacate arbitration awards. See Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012). 
 60 See infra, notes 63–90 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra, notes 63–74 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra, notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
 63 See Magruder, 818 F.3d at 288 (finding that the provisions in § 9 and § 10 do not contain the 
“save for [this arbitration] agreement” language that the Supreme Court relied on in Vaden and thus, 
the “look through” approach did not apply to those sections). The fact that § 9 and § 10 of the FAA 
lacked the specific “save for [this arbitration] agreement” language contained in § 4 was fundamental 
to the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a court could not “look through” a § 9 or § 10 petition to deter-
mine if it had jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement. See id. 
 64 See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (concluding unlike a § 4 petition, it was not proper to “look 
through” a § 10 petition to determine if the underlying claims were based on federal question jurisdic-
tion). The petitioners in Goldman argued that a federal court should “look through” a § 10 petition to 
2018] Determining Jurisdiction Under the Federal Arbitration Act 511 
Although the Third Circuit conceded that there were superficial reasons to 
treat a § 10 petition to vacate an arbitration award like a § 4 petition to compel 
arbitration, it ultimately found that the differences in statutory language be-
tween § 4 and § 10 were too vast to be treated alike.65 The court in Goldman 
further supported its textual analysis by concluding that as a matter of policy, 
Congress intended to treat petitions to compel arbitration and motions to va-
cate arbitration awards differently.66 The court in Goldman reasoned that when 
enacting the FAA, Congress focused on enforcing arbitration agreements and 
not reviewing arbitration awards; therefore, the textual differences between § 4 
and § 10 were intentionally different.67 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Third 
and Seventh Circuits that the Vaden Court’s reliance on the statutory language 
of § 4 was crucial to its holding, but the Second Circuit departed from its sister 
circuits in its finding that the “look through” approach could be applied to oth-
er sections of the FAA.68 In Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, a claimant 
petitioned the court to modify an arbitration award based upon the underlying 
claim of federal securities fraud.69 The Second Circuit emphasized the im-
portance of statutory language in determining that the “look through” approach 
applied to sections outside of § 4 of the FAA.70 The court found that when in-
terpreting statutes, it is essential to read the statute as a whole because each 
                                                                                                                           
vacate an award to see if it was predicated on an action that “arises under” federal law following the 
Vaden Court’s holding. See id. at 252 (explaining that the petitioners argued that a § 10 petition 
should be treated the same way as a § 4 petition in determining jurisdiction). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion 
is a motion to dismiss a matter because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 248. 
 65 See id. at 252 (finding that a close reading of the Vaden decision weakened the plaintiff’s su-
perficial reasoning to treat a § 10 petition like a § 4 petition). The court found treating § 4 motions to 
compel arbitration and § 10 motions to vacate arbitrations awards the same purely because they were 
in the same FAA had superficial appeal when the statutory language differences were evaluated. See 
id. at 253 (holding that the textual provisions in § 4 were central to the Court’s decision in Vaden and 
§ 10 lacks the “save for [this arbitration] agreement” language that § 4 contains). 
 66 See id. at 254 (finding that Congress intended to treat petitions to compel arbitration and mo-
tions to vacate differently, which is why the language of § 4 cannot be interpreted to apply to § 10); 
Minor v. Prudential Sec., 94 F.3d 1103, 1107 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the primary federal interest 
in enacting the FAA was to enforce arbitration agreements and not to review arbitration decisions, so 
it makes sense that Congress wanted to give federal courts more power to enforce arbitration agree-
ments rather than review the arbitration awards). 
 67 See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (holding that Congress’s central interest in creating the FAA 
was to enforce arbitration agreements and not to review the arbitration decisions). 
 68 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 381–82 (finding that the differences in the statutory language of § 10 
of the FAA and § 4 should not be minimized). The court in Doscher held that the “look through” 
approach is applicable to § 10 of the FAA. Id. at 389. 
 69 Id. at 374 (explaining that the claimant began arbitration over an alleged breach of contract and 
a claim for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission). The claimant sought more than $15 million in damages 
and was awarded around $2.3 million by the arbitration panel. Id. 
 70 Id. at 381–82 (holding that the text of § 4 drove the court’s decision to adopt the “look–
through” approach to § 10 petitions). 
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provision is dependent upon the context of the entire statute.71 The court went 
on to hold that the “look through” approach should be applied to a § 10 peti-
tion to vacate an arbitration award in order to avoid the unacceptable result of 
allowing courts to have jurisdiction over pre–award enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement but not post-award enforcement.72 
The court further disagreed with the Third and Seventh Circuits’ policy 
rational that Congress’s only concern in enacting the FAA was the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements and post-award judicial review.73 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that if Congress’s only focus had been the enforcement of arbitration, 
Congress would not have added the substantive sections that provide the rules 
for vacating, modifying, and confirming arbitration awards.74 
B. Ortiz-Espinosa Expands the “Look Through” Approach to  
Multiple Sections of the FAA 
In 2017, in Ortiz-Espinosa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
expanded the Second Circuit’s decision in Doscher and held the “look 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. at 382 (noting the preferred meaning of one statutory section is one that harmonizes it 
with the entire statute). A statute should be read as a whole since the meaning of the language within 
each provision is dependent upon the context. See id. (explaining that language within a statute de-
pends upon the context). 
 72 Id. at 386–87 (holding that failing to apply the “look through” approach to all provisions of the 
FAA creates a “totally artificial distinction,” which Vaden rejected). The court in Doscher wanted to 
avoid the same “curious practical consequences” that Vaden sought to avoid. See id. (noting that ap-
plying the “look through” approach to the FAA in its entirety prevented the unusual practical conse-
quences that the Vaden Court avoided). Doscher further found if the Court’s decision in Vaden was 
based on the textual language exclusively, then § 4 would have the effect of conferring subject matter 
jurisdiction, which the FAA does not do. Id. at 388; see also Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59 (noting that the 
FAA is a unique in the sense that it does not confer subject matter jurisdiction in itself and there must 
be an independent jurisdictional basis); 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Federal Question 
Jurisdiction § 32:12, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (explaining that the FAA does not pro-
vide federal jurisdiction by itself, but there has to be an independent basis that provides a federal ques-
tion and thus, gives the court subject matter jurisdiction). 
 73 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 387 (finding that Congress created independent provisions to compel 
arbitration and to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards and there is no reason why Congress 
would have made some provisions more enforceable than others). 
 74 See id. (explaining that if Congress was only concerned about compelling arbitration, it would 
not have needed to create sections regarding the enforcement of arbitration awards). The Goldman 
court found that the primary interest in enacting the FAA was to enforce arbitration agreements, not 
review arbitration awards. See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 254 (noting that Congress’s primary concern was 
not how courts reviewed arbitration decisions, but rather, how courts enforced arbitration agreements). 
Thus, it would follow that Congress would provide mechanisms to ensure that federal courts could 
enforce arbitration agreements, but not provide the same tools to a federal court to review the arbitra-
tion award. See id. (concluding that because of Congress’s primary goal regarding the FAA, it would 
make sense that the tools to enforce arbitration are different than the ones to review arbitration 
awards). 
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through” approach applied to §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA.75 The First Circuit 
found that the “look through” approach created one single jurisdictional test to 
apply to the FAA and avoided the “curious practical consequences” that con-
cerned the Supreme Court in Vaden.76 Instead of focusing on the differences in 
statutory language between §§ 9–11 and § 4, the court in Ortiz-Espinosa fo-
cused on creating a unified jurisdictional approach.77 The First Circuit found 
that if the “look through” test is not applied to §§ 9–11 of the FAA, the result 
would give a federal court jurisdiction to compel arbitration but for the same 
issue the court could not enforce the arbitration award that it compelled in the 
first place.78 The result of failing to apply the “look through” approach to en-
force an arbitration award has the potential to create inconsistencies among 
arbitration decisions.79 The First Circuit explained that inconsistencies were a 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 47 (holding that the “look through” approached applied to 
§§ 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA). Sections 9–11 of the FAA give the courts power to review arbitration 
awards by confirming, modifying, or vacating them. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012). Under the FAA, once 
an arbitration award has been issued, there must be a judicial decree confirming, vacating, modifying, 
or correcting the award under §§ 9–11. See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 42 (explaining that §§ 9–11 
provide courts with the power to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award). Section 9 of the 
FAA requires the court to confirm an award after it has been issued unless it is vacated, modified, or 
corrected under §§ 10 and 11. Id. at 47 (noting that a court must confirm an arbitration award under 
§ 9 of the FAA unless the award has been modified, vacated, or corrected under § 10 and § 11). Sec-
tion 10 of the FAA gives the courts the power to vacate an arbitration award due to corruption, fraud, 
undue means, arbitrator misconduct, or due to an arbitrator exceeding their powers. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 
(giving a court the power to vacate an arbitration award). Section 11 of the FAA allows the courts to 
modify or correct the arbitration awards where there was a material mistake in calculating the award 
or the award was imperfect and does not reflect the merits of the controversy. See id. § 11 (providing 
courts with the power to modify or correct arbitration awards). 
 76 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 46 (finding that giving a federal court jurisdiction to compel 
arbitration but not enforce the arbitration award would result in an absurd distinction between cases 
filed in the same court, where applying the “look through” approach to the entire act creates one single 
jurisdictional basis). For example, if the “look through” approach was not used, a federal court would 
have the power to compel arbitration per the Vaden decision under § 4 of the FAA, yet once the arbi-
tration award was given, it would have no jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. See id. (ex-
plaining that if the “look through” approach is not used, a situation could arise where a federal court 
could compel arbitration, but a state court would be enforcing the arbitration award). 
 77 See id. at 44 (noting there are statutory differences in the language of § 4 and §§ 9–11 since the 
latter sections don’t contain the same language “save for [the arbitration] agreement”). Section 4 peti-
tions to compel arbitration deals with pre–award enforcement of arbitration agreements, whereas 
§§ 9–11 petitions deal with post–award enforcement—that is, confirming, vacating, modifying, or 
correcting an arbitration award. See id. (describing the differences between §§ 9–11 petitions, which 
deal with post-award enforcement, and § 4 petitions, which deal with pre-award enforcement). Despite 
the statutory differences, the court found it more practical to have one jurisdictional approach that is 
equally applicable to all provisions of the FAA. See id. at 46 (finding that the “look through” approach 
creates a uniform method in determining jurisdiction to provisions in the FAA). 
 78 See id. (holding that the “look through” approach provided a unitary approach to jurisdictional 
issues arising under the FAA). 
 79 See id. at 47 (finding that making litigants go back to state court to enforce an arbitration award 
has the potential to create inconsistencies between federal and state court decisions). The court found 
it strange to refuse a federal forum where the underlying claim is based on an exclusive federal juris-
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possibility when federal courts could be involved in the pre-award enforce-
ment to compel arbitration under § 4, but state courts would have jurisdiction 
over enforcing that same arbitration award.80 
Additionally, the court found the “look through” approach applied to 
§§ 9–11 because it is the only approach that provides broad federal jurisdiction 
over the proceedings to enforce post-arbitration awards.81 Compelling courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements was a key objective of the FAA.82 When Con-
gress enacted the FAA it wanted to overcome judicial hostility towards arbitra-
tion agreements by compelling the courts to treat arbitration equal to con-
tracts.83 The court explained it would not make sense that Congress would 
have intended to exclude federal jurisdiction in enforcing post-arbitration 
awards when the enforcement of arbitration awards in general was the primary 
objective of the FAA.84 The First Circuit did not believe that Congress only 
intended federal courts to have jurisdiction over §§ 9–11 petitions in instances 
of diversity or admiralty.85 Thus, by applying the “look through” approach to 
§§ 9, 10, and 11, the First Circuit expanded the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Vaden and found it proper for the district court to “look through” the Investors’ 
petition to vacate or modify post arbitration awards in order to determine if the 
court would have jurisdiction over the underlying controversy.86 
                                                                                                                           
diction claim such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and allow a state court to decide federal 
law. Id. 
 80 See id. (explaining that it would be inconsistent to allow federal courts to enforce arbitration 
but then allow state courts sole jurisdiction in enforcing the arbitration awards that resulted from the 
same dispute). 
 81 See id. at 42 (holding that enforcing arbitration agreements in the first place was a primary goal 
of the FAA but the post–arbitration award enforcement was central to that goal). The structure of the 
FAA was meant to combat delays and expenses that were associated with litigation when there was 
already an arbitration agreement in place. See id. (noting that the FAA was designed to increase effi-
ciency in making arbitration agreements enforceable); see also Doscher, 832 F.3d at 387 (noting that 
if Congress only intended there to be federal jurisdiction over § 4 petitions to compel arbitration, it 
would have been unnecessary to enact § 10 or § 11 of the FAA; therefore those provisions were in-
tended to have a substantive effect). 
 82 Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 42. 
 83 See id. (finding both the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the post-arbitration reme-
dies of arbitration were central goals of the FAA); see also Wilson, supra note 14, at 92, 99 (explain-
ing how prior to the enactment of the FAA, some courts would refuse to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment when one of the parties no longer wanted to arbitrate the issue that it had agreed to arbitrate in 
the agreement). 
 84 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 43 (explaining that by including §§ 9–11 in the FAA, Congress 
intended there to be federal court review of post-arbitration awards); see also Hall, 552 U.S. at 581 
(finding that the FAA created mechanisms for enforcing arbitration awards). 
 85 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (holding that it makes little sense to remove federal juris-
diction over post-arbitration awards when there is a federal question at issue). 
 86 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2008) (holding that when determining subject 
matter jurisdiction, the court should “look through” the § 4 motion to compel arbitration to see if it 
would have jurisdiction over the underlying controversy); Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 47 (concluding 
that the “look through” approach applied to §§ 9–11 of the FAA). 
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After the Vaden decision, it is settled law that the “look through” ap-
proach applies to § 4 petitions to compel arbitration.87 Following Ortiz-
Espinosa, the First Circuit held that the “look through approach” also applies 
to § 9 petitions to confirm arbitration awards, § 10 petitions to vacate arbitra-
tion awards, and § 11 petitions to modify arbitration awards.88 The Second 
Circuit held that the “look through” approach applies to § 10 petitions to va-
cate arbitration awards.89 In contrast, the Third and Seventh Circuits held that 
the “look through” approach applies exclusively to § 4 petitions and does not 
apply to other provisions in the FAA.90 
III. THE “LOOK THROUGH” APPROACH SHOULD BE APPLIED 
CONSISTENTLY TO ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FAA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA 
Securities of Puerto Rico, Inc. correctly extended the Vaden v. Discovery Bank 
“look through” approach to §§ 9, 10, and 11 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) to determine which court, state or federal, has subject matter jurisdic-
tion.91 Section A of this Part argues that although the differences in statutory 
language are important, the rigid textual reliance that the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Third and Seventh Circuits placed on § 4 of the FAA were mis-
placed, and differences in the statutory language of provisions within the same 
statute should be read harmoniously.92 Section B of this Part also argues that 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 62 (holding that the “look through” approach applies to § 4 petitions to 
compel arbitration). 
 88 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 47 (finding that the “look through” approach also applies to 
§§ 9–11 petitions). 
 89 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 389 (holding that the “look through” approach is applicable to § 10 of 
the FAA). 
 90 See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 834 F.3d 242, 254 (3d Cir. 2016) (concluding that the 
“look through” approach did not extend to § 10 petitions to vacate arbitration awards); Magruder v. 
Fid. Brokerage Servs., 818 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the “look through” approach 
did not apply to § 9 and § 10 petitions because those provisions lacked the “save for [this arbitration] 
agreement” language contained in § 4, which was fundamental to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Vaden). 
 91 See Ortiz-Espinosa v. BBVA Sec. of P.R., 852 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding that the 
Vaden court’s “look through” approach extended to §§ 9–11 of the FAA); see also Vaden v. Discover 
Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2008) (holding that it is appropriate for a federal court to “look through” a § 4 
petition to compel arbitration to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy to see if there is sub-
ject matter jurisdiction). 
 92 See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 834 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the tex-
tual differences between § 4 and § 10 of the FAA were crucial in the court’s decision not to apply the 
“look through” approach to § 10 petitions); Magruder v. Fid. Brokerage Servs., 818 F.3d 285, 288 
(7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that neither § 9 nor § 10 had comparable language to § 4 of the FAA). But 
see Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., 832 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that despite the tex-
tual differences between § 10 and § 4, a statute should be read as a whole). Both Magruder and Gold-
man found that the “look through” approach was not appropriate to apply to provisions in the FAA 
outside of § 4 because they did not contain the same language as § 4. See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 253; 
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applying the “look through” approach to the entire FAA promotes consistency 
and avoids the “curious practical consequences” that the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Vaden sought to avoid.93 
A. Textual Differences Alone are not Enough to Apply Different 
Jurisdictional Tests 
There is no question that the inclusion or exclusion of specific statutory 
language should be given great weight; however, the statute must be read and 
interpreted as a whole because the meaning of the language is contextually 
dependent.94 For federal jurisdiction, courts have focused on interpreting the 
meaning of statutory language in the context of the entire statute rather than 
specific provisions to ensure federal jurisdiction is not applied differently to 
provisions within an act when Congress did not intend to do so.95 Because the 
textual differences among the provisions in the FAA alone are not enough to 
warrant different jurisdictional approaches, Congressional intent must be ex-
plicit to warrant treating the provisions differently.96 
Furthermore, because the Supreme Court made it clear in Vaden that the 
FAA does not on its face create federal jurisdiction, its reliance on the textual 
language in § 4 cannot be taken in isolation.97 If the text alone was what the 
                                                                                                                           
Magruder, 818 F.3d at 288. But see Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (holding that a difference in the 
statutory language of provisions within an act does not compel a holding by itself). The statutory lan-
guage of provisions should be examined by reading the whole statute together because the meaning of 
a section is dependent the context of the entire statute. See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382. In Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Manning, the Court found that the language “brought to enforce” and “aris-
ing under” had the same meaning in regards to determining federal jurisdiction. See 136 S. Ct. 1562, 
1570–71 (2016) (finding different words to have the same meaning regarding jurisdiction); see also 
Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (referencing the holding in Merrill Lynch). 
 93 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 65 (finding that it would result in “curious practical consequences” to 
allow a federal court jurisdiction over a § 4 petition only when there was already a federal issue claim 
before the Court); Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 46 (holding that there would be “curious practical con-
sequences” to allow federal jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration, but deny it to enforce the 
arbitration award over the identical controversy). 
 94 See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (noting that the cardinal rule is that 
a statute should be read as a whole rather than as individual provisions because construing statutory 
language is dependent upon the context of the entire statute); Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382 (finding that a 
statute should be read as a whole because the meaning of the language is contextually dependent). 
 95 See Merrill Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1576 (holding that the different provisions in the statute, 
“brought to enforce” and “arising under,” had the same meaning with respect to determining jurisdic-
tion). 
 96 See Magruder, 818 F.3d at 288 (holding that the “look through” approach applies to § 4 of the 
FAA but not to the provisions outside of it because they contain different statutory language); Gold-
man, 834 F.3d at 253 (finding that the “look through” approach applied to § 4 of the FAA but not to 
§ 10 since § 10 did not contain the “save for [the arbitration] agreement” language that the Court in 
Vaden relied upon). But see Doscher, 832 F.3d at 386 (explaining that if Congress only wanted federal 
courts having the ability to compel arbitration then it did not need to include § 10 or § 11 of the FAA). 
 97 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59 (noting that the FAA does not create federal jurisdiction in itself, but 
rather allows access to a federal forum); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (quoting 
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Vaden decision was based upon, then the Court read into the FAA the power to 
create subject matter jurisdiction—a power courts have been clear to reject.98 
The Court has made it clear that for a federal court to have jurisdiction over the 
FAA, there must be an independent jurisdictional hook; therefore, it is a stretch 
to reason that the text of § 4 alone provides federal courts with jurisdiction to 
“look through” an arbitration agreement governed by the FAA.99 Thus, contra-
ry to the Third and Seventh Circuits, the textual differences within the provi-
sions of the FAA are not enough to justify different jurisdictional applications 
within the same statute.100 
B. Applying the “Look Through” Approach Avoids “Curious Practical 
Consequences” 
Instead of basing jurisdiction on artificial textual distinctions, the “look 
through” approach should be applied to the entire FAA because it creates con-
sistency and prevents the “curious practical consequences” that the Supreme 
Court in Vaden sought to avoid.101 It would have been strange for Congress to 
                                                                                                                           
Moses H. Cone Mem’l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983)) (explaining that the 
body of federal substantive law created by the FAA applied to both state and federal courts); see also 
Szalai, supra note 4, at 323 (noting that there must be an independent basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion for a federal court to enforce the provisions of the FAA). 
 98 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 581–82 (2007) (reaffirming that the FAA 
does not create federal jurisdiction, and that there must be an independent jurisdictional basis to reach 
the federal courts); Doscher, 832 F.3d at 382 (finding that the FAA does not provide subject matter 
jurisdiction, so therefore there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for a federal court to have 
jurisdiction); see also 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION., supra note 72 (explaining that a 
party must establish an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction that is independent of the 
FAA for a federal court to have jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement). 
 99 See Szalai, supra note 4, at 323 (explaining that there has to be an independent basis for a fed-
eral court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the FAA). 
 100 See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 253–54 (finding that the different language of § 4 and § 10 warrant-
ed different jurisdictional approaches); Magruder, 818 F.3d at 288 (explaining that § 9 and § 10 do 
not have the similar language of § 4 and therefore should be treated differently). But see Ortiz-
Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (noting that a difference in language between sections of a statute does not 
mandate that the sections be treated differently). In the Vaden decision, the Court focused on the statu-
tory language of § 4 of the FAA “save for [the arbitration] agreement” in reaching its conclusion that 
the “look through” approach should be applied to determine subject matter jurisdiction. See Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); 556 U.S. at 62 (noting that the textual provisions in § 4 were 
essential in finding that the “look through” approach should be applied to determine subject matter 
jurisdiction over petitions to compel arbitration). Sections 9, 10, and 11 all omit the “save for [the 
arbitration] agreement” text relied on so heavily in Vaden, which has caused the split in circuits over 
the applicability of the “look through” approach to the rest of the FAA. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11; see Gold-
man, 834 F.3d at 253 (explaining that § 10 lacks the “save for [this arbitration] agreement” language 
that § 4 contains). Although the inclusion of specific statutory language is important, it is not always 
considered determinative. See Merrill Lynch, 136 S. Ct. at 1576 (holding the statutory context is need-
ed to understand the language of a particular provisions); Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (commenting 
that differences in statutory language do not mandate that the sections should be treated differently). 
 101 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 45 (finding that if the “look through” approach is not applied 
to the provisions outside of § 4, then there would be no way for a federal court to have jurisdiction to 
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only intend there to be federal jurisdiction to compel arbitration, yet to enforce 
the arbitration award, arising from the same arbitration, there would be no fed-
eral jurisdiction.102 If this was Congress’s intention in enacting the FAA, Con-
gress would not have needed to include §§ 9–11 in the FAA.103 
The Court in Vaden did not exclusively rely on the textual provisions in 
§ 4 of the FAA; therefore, its secondary support seeking to avoid “curious 
practical consequences” cannot be overlooked.104 It would result in similar 
“curious practical consequences” to allow federal courts to compel arbitration 
yet not allow those courts to enforce, vacate, or modify the arbitration award 
that arose out of the same issue.105 Thus, it would be a mistake to fail to apply 
the “look through” approach to other sections of the FAA.106 Such a mistake 
would result in creating the same “curious practical consequences” that the 
Court in Vaden avoided.107 
CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit in Ortiz-Espinosa correctly extended the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Vaden by expanding the “look through” approach to §§ 9–
11 of the FAA. Applying the “look through” approach creates consistency in 
compelling arbitration and vacating, modifying, or enforcing the arbitration 
award based on the same underlying issue. The “look through” approach aligns 
with Congress’s intention of overcoming judicial hostility towards arbitration 
agreements by allowing federal courts to have power to enforce post-
arbitration awards. Further, applying the “look through” approach to the FAA 
                                                                                                                           
enforce the post-arbitration award except for in cases in diversity and maritime instances); Doscher, 
832 F.3d at 386–87 (failing to apply the “look through” approach creates the “totally artificial distinc-
tions” that Vaden dismissed). 
 102 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 46–47 (noting that it would be inconsistent to be denied a 
federal forum when the underlying federal issue is based on a federal law); Doscher, 832 F.3d at 387 
(holding that to allow federal jurisdiction for petitions to compel arbitration where the underlying 
controversy is a federal issue yet forbid federal court enforcement of the post-award enforcement of 
the same issue would be an absurd distinction). 
 103 See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 386 (concluding that if Congress only cared about federal courts 
having the ability to compel arbitration then it did not need to include § 10 or § 11 of the FAA). 
 104 See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 105 See Ortiz-Espinosa, 852 F.3d at 46 (finding that it would be strange to allow federal jurisdic-
tion over a § 4 petition to compel arbitration but not to confirm or vacate an arbitration award based 
on the same underlying claim). 
 106 See id. at 47 (holding that the “look through” approach applies to §§ 9–11 of the FAA). 
 107 See id. at 46 (finding that failing to apply the “look through” approach would create the unu-
sual practical consequence that the Vaden court wanted to avoid). In Vaden the Court applied the 
“look through” approach in order to avoid the “curious practical consequences” of being able to liti-
gate an issue in federal court but not have federal jurisdiction over that same issue to compel arbitra-
tion. See 556 U.S. at 65 (explaining that the “curious practical consequences” that would result if the 
“look through” approach was not used when determining jurisdiction over a § 4 petition to compel 
arbitration). 
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consistently avoids the “curious practical consequences” that the Court in Va-
den sought to prevent. Thus, the textual reliance that the Third and Seventh 
Circuits placed on the different provisions within the FAA were misplaced. If 
the text of § 4 in the FAA was the only reason the Court in Vaden applied the 
“look through” test, the “save for [the arbitration] agreement” language, in ef-
fect, expanded a federal court’s jurisdiction over the FAA because it bestowed 
a federal court with the power to examine an arbitration agreement without 
having independent subject matter jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement, 
which is contrary to almost every precedent the Supreme Court has decided 
regarding the FAA. 
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